Online social media provide users with unprecedented opportunities to engage with diverse opinions. Simultaneously, they allow the spread of misinformation by empowering individuals to selfselect the narratives they want to be exposed to, both through active (confirmation bias) and passive (personalized news algorithms) self-reinforcing mechanisms. A precise theoretical understanding of such trade-offs is still largely missing. We introduce a stylized social learning model where most participants in a network update their beliefs unbiasedly based on the arrival of new information, while a fraction of participants display confirmation bias, enabling them to reject news that are incongruent with their pre-existing beliefs. We show that this simple confirmation bias mechanism can generate permanent opinion polarisation. Furthermore, the model results in states where unbiased agents behave "as if" they were biased, due to their biased neighbours effectively functioning as gatekeepers, restricting their access to free and diverse information. We derive analytic results for the distribution of individual agents' beliefs, explicitly demonstrating the aforementioned trade-off between confirmation bias and social connectivity, which we further validate against US county-level data on the impact of Internet access on the formation of beliefs about global warming. Our findings indicate that confirmation bias in small doses may actually result in improved accuracy across individuals by preserving information diversity in a social network. However, results also indicate that when confirmation bias grows past an optimal value, accuracy declines as biased agents restrict information flow to subgroups. We discuss the policy implications of our model, highlighting the downside of debunking strategies and suggesting alternative strategies to contrast misinformation.
I. INTRODUCTION
We currently live in a paradoxical stage of the information age. The more we gain access to unprecedented amounts of knowledge thanks to digital technologies, the less our societies seem capable of discerning what is true from what is false, even in the presence of overwhelming evidence in support of a particular position. For example, large segments of our societies do not believe in the reality of climate change [1] or believe in the relationship between vaccinations and autism [2] .
As recent studies indicate, over two-thirds of US adults get information from online and social media, with the proportion growing annually [3, 4] . Hence, the impact such media have in shaping societal narratives cannot be understated. Online media empower their users to choose the news sources they want to be exposed to. This, in turn, makes it easier to restrict exposure only to narratives that are congruent to pre-established viewpoints [5] [6] [7] [8] , and this positive feedback mechanism is further exacerbated by the widespread use of personalized news algorithms [9] . In other words, confirmation bias [10, 11] is enabled at unprecedented scales [12] .
Another major impact of digital technologies has been the increase in connectivity fostered by the growth of online social networks, which plays a double-edged role. On the one hand, it can compound the effects of confirmation bias, as users are likely to re-transmit the same information they are selectively exposed to, leading to fragmented societies that break down into online "echo chambers" where the same opinions keep being bounced around [12, 13] . On the other hand, it also translates into a potentially increased heterogeneity of the information and viewpoints users are exposed to [14] [15] [16] .
Online social networks can therefore both improve and restrict the diversity of information individuals engage with, and their net effect is still very much debated. Empirical research is still in its infancy, with evidence for both positive and negative effects being found [15, 17, 18] . The theoretical literature is lagging somewhat further behind. While there exist a plethora of models related to information diffusion and opinion formation in social networks, a sound theoretical framework accounting for the emergence of the phenomena that are relevant to modern information consumption (rather than explicitly introducing them ad hoc), is still largely lacking.
In bounded confidence models [19] [20] [21] [22] agents only interact with others sharing similar opinions, and thus are characterized by a form of confirmation bias. In such models polarisation is a natural outcome assuming agents are narrow enough in their choice of interaction partners [23] . However, these models tend to lack behavioural microfoundations, a mechanism to link signal diffusion to opinion formation, and are rarely analytically tractable.
Social learning models in Economics [24] [25] [26] provide a broader, empirically grounded, and analytically tractable framework to understand information aggregation [27] . Their main drawback, however, is that by design they tend to arXiv:1808.08524v1 [physics.soc-ph] 26 Aug 2018 produce long run population consensus, hence fail to account for any form of opinion heterogeneity or polarisation [28] . These can be typically generated ad hoc by introducing "stubborn" agents that remain fully attached to their initial opinions rather than interacting and learning from their neighbors [29, 30] , a mechanism reminiscent of confirmation bias. However, the conditions under which polarisation occurs are quite strict, as populations converge towards consensus as soon as stubborn agents accept even a negligible fraction of influence from their neighbors.
The purpose of the present paper is to develop a framework that naturally captures the effect of large-scale confirmation bias on social learning, and to examine how it can drastically change the way a networked, decentralized, society processes information. We provide an analytical description of the model's steady state properties both at the macroscopic scale, where we determine under what conditions the model ends up in a consensus or in a polarised state, and at the microscopic scale, where we are able to study the full distribution of each individual's available information. At the mesoscopic scale of agent groups, we instead show under what conditions the model fragments into echo chambers, and describe their statistical properties. Our model unveils a stylized yet rich phenomenology which, as we will discuss in our final remarks, has substantial correspondence with the available empirical evidence, and indicates that analogous effects can happen in real-world social networks.
II. MODEL DEFINITION

Social learning and confirmation bias
We consider a model of a social network that is a graph G = (V, E), that consists of a set of agents V (where |V | = n), and the edges between them (E ⊆ V × V ). Each agent seeks to learn the unobservable ground truth about a binary statement, such as, e.g., "global warming is / is not happening" or "gun control does / does not reduces crime". The value X = +1 represents the statement's true value, whose negation we assume to be X = −1.
Following standard social learning frameworks [27] , at the beginning of time (t = 0), each agent i (i = 1, . . . , n) independently receives an initial signal s i = ±1, which is informative of the underlying state, i.e. p = Prob(s i = +1|X = +1) = 1 − Prob(s i = −1|X = +1) > 1/2. Signals can be thought of as news, stories, quotations, etc., that support or detract from the ground truth. The model evolves in discrete time steps, and at each time step t > 0 all agents synchronously share with their neighbors the full set of signals they have accrued up to that point. For example, the time t = 1 information set of an agent i with two neighbors j and will be s i (t = 1) = {s i , s j , s }, their time t = 2 set will be s i (t = 2) = {s i , s i , s i , s j , s j , s , s , s d=2 }, where s d=2 denotes the set of all signals incoming from nodes at distance d = 2 (i.e. j's and 's neighbors), and so on. Furthermore, we define the following:
where N + i (t) and N − i (t) denote, respectively, the number of positive and negative signals accrued by i up to time t. We refer to this quantity as an agent's signal mix, and we straightforwardly generalize it to any set of agents G ⊆ V , i.e. we indicate the fraction of positive signals in their pooled information sets at time t as x G (t). The signal mix of all n agents at time t are vectorized as x(t). Note that the initial signal mix vector x(0) is an indicator vector denoting which nodes have been initially seeded with positive signals.
Each agent forms a posterior "belief" of the likelihood of the ground truth given their information sets using Bayes' rule. This is done under a bounded rationality assumption, as the agents fail to accurately model the statistical dependence between the signals they receive, substituting it with a naive updating rule that assumes all signals in their information sets to be independent 1 . This is a standard assumption of social learning models [27] that accounts for the computational constraints of human agents. Under such a Bayesian framework, the best guess an agent can make at any time over the true state of the world given their information set is precisely equal to their orientation y i (t), where y i (t) = +1 for x i (t) ≥ 1/2 and y i (t) = −1 for x i (t) < 1/2 2 . The fraction of positively oriented agents in a group of nodes G ⊆ V is denoted as y + G (t). The orientations of all n agents at time t are vectorised as y(t). We refer to an orientation switch as a situation where an agent changes orientation, i.e. y i (t + 1) = −y i (t) for some time t.
The polarisation z G (t) = min(y + G (t), 1 − y + G (t)) of the group G is then defined as the fraction of agents in that group that have the minority orientation. Note that polarisation equals zero when there is full consensus and all agents are either positively or negatively oriented. It is maximized when there are exactly half the group in each orientation.
It is useful to think of x(t), y(t) and z G (t) as respectively representing the pool of available signals, the conclusions agents draw on the basis of the available signals, and a summary measure of the heterogeneity of agents' conclusions. In the context of news diffusion, for example, they would represent the availability of news of each type across agents, the resulting agents' opinions on some topic, and the extent to which those opinions have converged to a consensus.
Biased and unbiased agents
Finally, we delineate between two kinds of agents in the model: unbiased agents and biased agents. Both agents share signals and update their posterior "beliefs" through Bayes rule, as described in the previous section. However, they differ in how they acquire incoming signals. Unbiased agents accept the set of signals provided by their neighbours without any distortion. On the other hand, biased agents exercise a model of confirmation bias [11, 32] , and are able to distort the information sets they accrue. We denote the two sets of agents as U and B, respectively, with U ∪ B = V and U ∩ B = ∅.
To describe the behaviour of these biased agents we use a slight variation of the confirmation bias model introduced by Rabin and Shrag [33] . We refer to an incoming signal s as congruent to i if it is aligned with i's current orientation, i.e. if s = y i (t), and incongruent if s = −y i (t). When biased agents are presented with incongruent signals, they reject them with a fixed probability q and replace them with a congruent signal, which they add to their information set and propagate to their neighbors. We refer to q as the confirmation bias parameter. It is convenient to define the set of positively oriented biased agents at any time t as B + (t), and the corresponding fraction as y + B (t) = |B + (t)|/|B|. An intuitive interpretation of what this mechanism is intended to model is as follows: biased agents are empowered to reject incoming signals they disagree with, and instead refer to preferred sources of information to find signals that are congruent with their existing viewpoint. This mechanism models both active behaviour, where agents deliberately choose to ignore or contort information that contradicts their beliefs (mirroring the "backfire effect" evidenced both in psychological experiments [34, 35] and in online social network behaviour [36] ), and passive behaviour, where personalized news algorithms filter out incongruent information and select other information which coheres with the agents' beliefs [15] 3 .
In the following, we shall denote the fraction of biased agents in a network as f . We shall refer to networks where f = 0 as unbiased networks, and to networks where f > 0 as biased networks.
Mapping to DeGroot averaging processes
For the remainder of the paper, we assume that the social network G is an undirected k-regular network 4 . The motivation for this is two-fold. Firstly, empirical research [37] suggests that for online social networks such as Facebook (where social connections are symmetric), heterogenous network features such as hubs do not play a disproportionately significant role in the diffusion of information. Secondly, utilizing a simple k-regular network allows for considerable analytical tractability. In particular, the regular network structure (coupled with the aforementioned synchronous "belief" update dynamics) allows the information sets of all agents to grow at the same rate. However, we show in Appendix A that our results also hold under networks that introduce degree heterogeneity.
Most properties of the model, can be deduced by examining the empirical distribution of x(t), which determines the fraction of agents with signal mixes above and below 1/2 (and therefore their orientation). We are therefore interested in characterizing the evolution of such a vector. To do this, we find a representation of its dynamics in terms of a DeGroot averaging process [38] . DeGroot averaging processes are well-established in social learning models, and by mapping our model to such a process we are able to establish analytic results on key features.
The equivalence with DeGroot averaging processes is straightforward for unbiased networks. Due to the regularity of the network, the update process of the signal mix x(t), can be represented as follows: where A is the adjacency matrix representing G (with entries A ij = A ji = 1 if agents i and j are connected and A ij = A ji = 0 otherwise) and I n is the n × n identity matrix.
For biased networks, we demonstrate in [39] that the above confirmation bias mechanics can be reproduced with two mathematically equivalent frameworks. In the first, each biased agent i reassigns a fraction kq/(k + 1) of the weight it places on her neighbors to an external "ghost" node x (g) i (i = 1, . . . , f n), which places full weight on itself and keeps its orientation aligned with that of agent i, and its signal mix composes of only congruent signals. When agent i switches orientation, the ghost node also changes orientation (and its signal mix) accordingly. Alternatively, the same results can be obtained assuming that there only exist two ghost nodes of opposed orientations, and that biased agents place a fraction kq/(k + 1) of their outgoing weight on one of them depending on their orientation, and rewire such outgoing weight when switching orientation. The two representations can be naturally associated with different interpretations, as the first one allows to frame the distortion mechanism introduced above as an agent-specific bias (and bears resemblance to the concept of personalized algorithms, with an individual-specific "bot" managing information sources), while the second is more appropriate to model the role of competing exogenous information sources (such as two biased news channels).
While the two above representations are mathematically fully equivalent, the latter is notationally more succinct. We shall therefore frame the results in terms of the "exogenous source" model, with only two ghost nodes. We provide a sketch of this mapping in Fig. 1 . Refer to the augmented matrix and signal mix vector asÃ(t) (which is no longer symmetric, and dependent on the orientations of the biased agents at time t) andx, respectively. The updating process now simply reads:x(t) = (k + 1) −1 (Ã(t) + I n+2 )x(t − 1).
III. RESULTS
This section is devoted to presenting the main results of the model. Our main focus will be on the long-run properties of the dynamics introduced above. In this respect, it is crucial to establish whether the agents actually reach an equilibrium over their signal mixes and orientations, or whether they continue to oscillate. It is straightforward to demonstrate that unbiased networks always converge to a limiting steady state for their signal mixes and orientations, which follows directly from the correspondence between such networks and DeGroot models, and the set of results on those networks established in [3] . The convergence of biased networks is much less trivial to prove due to the non-linear dynamics introduced by the confirmation bias mechanics. Nevertheless, in [39] we establish a number of results to demonstrate the convergence of such networks under a variety of topological conditions.
Building on this, we are able to establish the following fundamental analytic results on networks of any size (in the following, and throughout the rest of the paper, we shall denote the steady state value of a variable v as v * ):
• Unbiased networks always reach consensus, and all agents converge to a steady state signal mix which precisely reflects the original, unbiased informative signals injected into the network (i.e., x * i =x(0), wherex(0) = n −1 n i=1 x i (0)). • Agents in biased networks do not, in general, converge to a steady state signal mix which reflects the original, unbiased informative signals injected into the network, but rather reflects the orientations of only the biased agents.
• If the sub-population of biased agents reaches a consensus, all agents in the biased networks will reach a consensus.
• If the sub-population of biased agents do not reach a consensus, all agents in the biased network are unlikely to reach a consensus. The exact conditions for this depend on the distribution of signal mixes, which are established below.
From the above, we can conclude that unbiased networks efficiently aggregate the information available to them at t = 0, and reach consensus on the ground truth with high probability, sincex(0) > 1/2 as soon as the signals are slightly informative [31] . In contrast, the outcome of the information aggregation process in biased networks ends up being entirely determined by the long-run orientations of biased agents. We shall devote the following sections to examine the consequences of the model in greater detail through mean field approximations coupled with numerical verifications on finite networks.
Global signal mix
The global signal mix refers to the long run equilibrium of signals of different types (positive and negative) that is maintained across all agents as a result of the information sharing dynamics outlined in this model. In particular, we are interested in the signal mix of unbiased agents in biased networks (x * U ) to provide a like for like comparison with the fully unbiased networks. In the context of the diffusion of news, the global signal mix can be thought of as a model of the long term balance of news of different types that survive following the diffusion dynamics.
For unbiased networks, it is demonstrated in [31] that x * V =x(0) 5 . That is, the steady state signal mix in unbiased networks precisely reflects the original, unbiased informative signals injected into the network. Determining the steady state signal mix of biased networks entails considering the interactions between three subpopulations -the unbiased agents U , positively biased agents B + , and negatively biased agents B − .
We first consider the case where the biased agents have settled in their orientation at some time t * (i.e. y B (t ) = y * B for any t ≥ t * ) 6 . Using a mean field approach, we show in [39] that the expected steady state signal mix of each subpopulation is:
Let us now consider the situation under which t * = 0, i.e. where the initial orientation of each biased agent does not change, and is therefore equal to the initial signal it receives. Intuitively, this will occur for large q which allows for biased agents to reject the majority of incongruent signals they receive (shortly we demonstrate in fact this generally occurs for q > 0.5). Given Eq. (2), we can therefore calculate the steady state signal mix of any subset of agents based on our knowledge of the distribution of the initial signals.
The average signal mix x * U of unbiased agents is determined by the initial proportion of positively oriented biased agents y + B (0), which is the mean of f n i.i.d. Bernoulli variables with probability p (which, we recall, denotes the probability of an initially assigned signal being informative). One can compare this to the unbiased networks (f = 0), where the long run average signal mix is x * V =x(0), and is hence the mean of n i.i.d. Bernoulli with probability p. Applying the central limit theorem we see that injecting a fraction f of biased agents therefore amplifies the variance of the long run global signal mix by a factor of f −1 with respect to the unbiased case: In the remaining region, signal mixes of both types survive in the long run, and the balance between positive and negative signals reflects the fraction of positively oriented biased agents. The lower q falls, the easier it is to tip the network into a total assimilation of a single signal type.
This means that the "wisdom of unbiased crowds" is effectively undone by small biased populations, and the unbiased network's variability is recovered for f → 1, and not for f → 0 + , as one might intuitively expect.
Consider now the general case where biased agents can, in principle, switch orientation a few times before settling on their steady state orientation. In [39] we determine the conditions under which we expect to see systematic changes in the orientations. As q is lower, it is easier for an initial majority camp of biased agents to convert the minority camp of biased agents. As conversion of the minority camp begins, this triggers a domino effect as newly converted biased agents add to the critical mass of the majority camp and are able to overwhelm the minority orientation.
This mechanism allows us to derive analytic curves in the parameter space to approximate the steady state outcome of the unbiased agent population's average signal mix 7 based on the orientations of the biased agents at time 0:
The above result is sketched in Fig. 2 , and in Appendix A we show it matches numerical simulations (also in the case of heterogeneous networks) 8 . For 1/2 < q ≤ 1 biased agents can convert at least half of the incongruent signals they receive to their preferred type, meaning that biased agents of either orientation cannot be eradicated from the network, which preserves signals of both types in the steady state. For sufficiently small values of q, on the other hand, 7 Similar results can be obtained for the biased agents as in 2, but they are uninteresting. 8 For a broad region of the parameter space x * U = y + B (0) as in Eqn. 2, allowing us to draw the same conclusions as for the case where q = 1. small variations in the initial biased population translate to completely opposite consensus, and only by increasing the confirmation bias q, paradoxically, the model tends back to a balance of signals that resembles the initially available information.
Putting the above results together, we note that biased networks with small f and q are, surprisingly, the most unstable. Indeed, such networks sit on a knife-edge between two extremes where one signal type flourishes and the other is totally censored. In this context, the model indicates that confirmation bias helps preserve a degree of information heterogeneity, which, in turn, ensures that alternative viewpoints and information are not eradicated. In subsequent sections we consider a normative interpretation of this effect in the context of accuracy and learning.
Polarisation and echo chambers
So far we have derived the statistical properties of the average steady state signal mix across all unbiased agents. We now aim to establish how these signals are distributed across individual agents. Throughout the following, assume the global steady state signal mix x * U has been determined. We show in [39] that, in the limit of large n and k, x * i for i ∈ U is normally distributed with mean x * U and variance σ 2
x * U that can be approximated as follows:
In Appendix A we show this result to be quite accurate even when compared with simulations for small n and k. A key outcome of this result is that the long term polarisation of the unbiased agents z * U has a monotonic relationship with the variability of this distribution -that is, factors that increase σ 2
x * U for some given x * U will lead to a broader distribution and a greater fraction of agents crossing the signal mix threshold of 1/2 and changing their orientations y * U , resulting in increased polarisation z * U . This result further shows that the presence of biased agents is effectively responsible for the polarisation of unbiased agents in the steady state. Indeed, both a larger biased population and higher confirmation bias -i.e. higher f and q, respectively -result in an increased variance and steady state polarisation z * U , as shown in Fig. 3 (top left panel, where it is shown as an explicit function of x * U and f ). On the other hand, a larger degree k contrasts this effect by creating more paths to transport unbiased information. It is worth pointing out that the variance in (5) does not decay with n, showing that steady state polarisation persists even in the large n limit.
Finally, the consequences of this interplay at the mesoscopic level of agent clusters result in the emergence of "echo chambers". We define an echo chamber C as a subset of unbiased agents such that: C = {i ∈ U : N (i) ∈ B ∪ C ∧ N (i) ∩ C = ∅} (where N (i) refers to the immediate neighbourhood of i). In other words, an echo chamber is a set of connected unbiased agents such that all nodes are either connected to other nodes in the echo chamber or to biased agents. Therefore, biased agents form the echo chamber's boundary, which we refer to as ∂C. Echo chambers in our model represent groups of unbiased agents that are completely surrounded by biased agents who effectively modulate the information that can flow in and out of these groups. It should be emphasized that the fraction of the population trapped in these echo chambers is typically small. However, they allow us to examine the qualitative effect of confirmation bias (f, q) and connectivity k on the diffusion of signals, and the intuition readily extends to the unbiased agents that sit outside echo chambers.
Let us label the fraction of unbiased agents enclosed in an echo chamber as η C . We show in [39] through a straightforward application of percolation theory that, for large networks, η C increases with f , tending up to a critical threshold f c = 1 − 1/(k − 1), after which η C = 1 for f > f c . Conversely, η C decreases with k. Furthermore, the equilibrium signal mix of unbiased agents in echo chambers is well approximated by a weighted average between the signal mix of the biased agents surrounding them (x * ∂C ) and the signal mix x * U of the whole unbiased agent population:
The confirmation bias parameter q therefore determines the "permeability" of echo chambers to the information flow from the broader network.
Accuracy, efficiency and learning
Up until now, we have not attempted to make any normative interpretations of the ground truth X = +1. In the following, we shall refer to unbiased agents whose steady state orientation is positive (negative) as accurate (inaccurate) agents, and we shall define the overall accuracy A(G) of a network G as the expected fraction of accurate agents in the steady state. This allows us to investigate how biased and unbiased networks respond to changes in the reliability of the available information, which ultimately depends on the prevalence of positive or negative signals (modulated by the parameter p = Prob{s = +1|X = +1}), which, loosely speaking, can be interpreted as "real" and "fake" news.
The accuracy of unbiased networks obtains a neat closed form that can be approximated as A(G|f = 0) ≈ erfc((1 − 2p) n/2)/2 (see [31] ). For f > 0, we compute the expected accuracy as the expected fraction of accurate agents with respect to a certain global signal mix. This reads:
where P (x * U ) is the distribution of the average signal mix across unbiased agents (see Eq. (3)) 9 , and where we have used the previously mentioned Gaussian approximation for the distribution of individual signal mixes (whose variance σ 2
x * U is given by Eq. (5)). The top right panel in Fig. 3 contrasts biased and unbiased networks, and shows how the former remain very inefficient in aggregating information compared to the latter, even as the reliability of the signals (p) improve. However, accuracy in biased networks is non-monotonic with respect to f . As shown in the bottom left panel in Fig. 3 , accuracy reaches a maximum in correspondence of an optimal value f * . Intuitively, this is because for small values of f , as already discussed, the model can converge to the very inaccurate views of a small set of biased agents. As f grows, the views of the two biased camps tend to cancel each other out, and the signal set will more closely match the balance of the original distribution of signals (Eq. (3) ). However, in doing so large values of f lead to increased polarisation (Eq. (5)), where accurate and inaccurate agents coexist. The trade-off between balance and polarisation is optimised at f * .
It is also interesting to note that, as shown in the bottom right panel of Fig. 3 , the optimal fraction of biased agents f * and the corresponding maximum accuracy A(G|f = f * ) both increase monotonically with the degree. This indicates that as networks are better connected, they can absorb a greater degree of confirmation bias without affecting accuracy.
Internet access, confirmation bias, and social learning
We now seek to test some of the model's predictions against real world data. As a test case, we employ the model to investigate the effect of online media in the process of opinion formation. Empirical literature on this phenomenon has been mixed, with different analyses reaching completely opposite conclusions, e.g., showing that Internet access increases [42] , decreases [43] and has no effect [44] on opinion polarisation.
Our position is that the effect of Internet access can be split into the effect it has on social connectivity and social discussion (k) and the residual effect it has on enabling active and passive confirmation bias behaviours (f ). As per Eq. (5), assuming the majority of the population accurately learns the ground truth (x * U > 0.5), increases in social discussion should improve consensus around the truth and reduce the fraction of inaccurate agents. However, when controlling for the improvement in social connectivity, we should expect an increase in Internet access to have the opposite effect.
We utilise data from the Yale Programme on Climate Change Communication [45] , which provides state and county level survey data on opinions on global warming, as well as information about the propensity to discuss climate change with friends and family, which proxies connectivity k. We combine this with FCC reports on county level broadband internet penetration, which proxies for f after controlling for the considerable effect this has on social connectivity 10 . We attempt to predict the fraction of each county's population that correctly learns that "global warming is happening" (see Appendix B for details on assumptions and results).
As predicted by our model, we find the accurate fraction of the population to have statistically significant positive relationships with k, and a negative relationship with f . We find such relationships to account for 65% of the variance in the data. This indicates that, after controlling for the improvements on social connectivity, Internet access does indeed increase polarisation and reduces a population's ability to accurately learn. While simple, this analysis illustrates the value of our model: by explicitly accounting for the separate effects of large-scale online communication (confirmation bias and connectivity), it can shed light on the mixed empirical results currently available in the literature.
IV. DISCUSSION
We introduced a model of social learning in networked societies where only a fraction of the agents update "beliefs" unbiasedly based on the arrival of new information. The model only provides a stylized representation of the realworld complexity underpinning the propagation of information and the ensuing opinion formation process. Its value stands in the transparency of the assumptions made, and in the fact that it allows us to "unpack" blanket terms such as, e.g., social media and internet penetration, by assigning specific parameters to their different facets, such as connectivity (k) and the level of confirmation bias it enables in a society (f, q). This, in turn, yields quantitative testable predictions that contribute to shed light on the mixed results that the empirical literature has so far collected on the effects online media have in shaping societal debates.
Our model indicates the possibility that the "narratives" (information sets) biased societies generate can be entirely determined by the composition of their sub-populations of biased reasoners. This is reminiscent of the overrepresentation in public discourse of issues that are often supported by small but dedicated minorities, such as GMO opposition [40] , and of the domination of political news sharing on Facebook by heavily partisan users [51] ; it also resonates with recent experimental results showing that committed minorities can overturn established social conventions [52] . The model indicates that societies that contain only small minorities of biased individuals (i.e. when f → 0 + ) may be much more prone to producing long run narratives that deviate significantly from their initially available information set (see Eq. (3)) than societies where the vast majority of the agents actively propagate biases. This resonates, for example, with Gallup survey data about vaccine beliefs in the US population, where only 6% of respondents report their belief in the relationship between vaccines and autism, but more than 50% report to be unsure about it and almost 75% report to have heard about the disadvantages of vaccinations [53] . Similarly, the model suggests that mild levels of confirmation bias (q 1) may prove to be the most damaging in this regard, as they cause societies to live on a "knife-edge" where small fluctuations in the information set initially available to the biased agent population can completely censor information signals from opposing viewpoints (see Fig. 2 ). All in all, the model suggests that a lack of confirmation bias can ensure that small biased minorities much more easily hijack and dictate public discourse.
The model suggests that as the prevalence of biased agents grows, the available balance of information improves and society is more likely to maintain a long term narrative that is representative of all the information available. On the other hand, it suggests that such societies may grow more polarised, with more echo chambers forming that restrict information sharing between agents of opposing views. When we examine the net effect of this trade off between bias and polarisation through an ensemble approach, our model suggests that the expected accuracy of a society may initially improve with the growth of confirmation bias, then reaches a maximum at a value f * before marginal returns to confirmation bias are negative, i.e. confirmation bias experiences an "optimal" intermediate value. The model suggests that such value and its corresponding accuracy should increase monotonically with a society's connectivity, meaning that more densely connected societies can support a greater amount of biased reasoners (and healthy debate between biased camps) before partitioning into echo chambers and suffering from polarisation.
All in all, our results imply that confirmation bias does not necessarily lead to the deterioration of a society's public discourse per se. On the one hand, our model indicates that the information processing capabilities of fully rational societies are unquestionably superior (see Fig. 3 , top right panel). However, fully unbiased networks represent utopian versions of our societies, which are instead unavoidably affected by biased reasoning. Our model suggests three strategies for dealing with the presence of confirmation bias and subsequent misinformation in such societies. The first is to engage in an "arms race" of confirmation bias, where debunking and refutation of information by one side must be counterbalanced by similarly motivated debunking on the other. This strategy seeks to ensure no single side overwhelms the debate and biases can counterbalance one another. While this improves accuracy in the short term, this soon leads to diminishing returns and suboptimal outcomes (f > f * ). This result potentially explains why debunking might not be the most effective strategy to contain the spreading of fake narratives [36, 41] . A more effective strategy is to foster increased connectivity between unbiased agents, which enables information sharing to bypass biased agents and enable better information aggregation across diverse agents. A final, more promising strategy involves improving the reliability of initial signals themselves (p; see Fig. 3 , top right panel), which can be accomplished by the active eradication of online fake narratives and their replacement with reliable information. Of course, the determination of which narratives are fake and which are reliable is fraught with its own challenges.
We presented here a stylized model of social learning in a networked society which explicitly accounts for confirmation bias, regardless of its specific causes. The model's result yield a rich phenomenology. A full empirical verification of the main results would require collecting very granular data, such as those generated in laboratory experiments with participants communicating via an artificial network (see, e.g., [54] ), which goes well beyond the scope of this work. Yet, the model predicts some trends that can be nonetheless easily verified on coarse-grained data, which we did on climate change survey data. This ultimately suggests that the modelling approach we put forward in this paper has the potential to capture and help explain the causes and consequences of effective social learning in a modern age.
Appendix A: Numerical validation of the model In this section, we demonstrate how the analytical predictions obtained for k-regular networks match numerical simulations of the model both in such networks and in Erdős-Rényi networks with average degree equal to k. Fig.  4 shows a numerically obtained version of the plot in Fig. 2 , where the model's parameter space regions leading to consensus and polarisation, and the transitions between them, are highlighted. Fig. 5 reports the empirical distribution of long-run signal mixes across the population, and shows that, as predicted by the model, it is very well fitted by a Gaussian distribution with mean x * U and variance given by Eq. (5) . Fig. 6 shows a comparison between the expected accuracy (Eq. (6)) and the average accuracy obtained over several independent simulations of the model. Results are shown for simulations on both k-regular (left) and Erdős-Rényi networks (right). Analytic predictions (given by Eq. 4) are denoted by solid red lines. The color gradient denotes the average long run signal mix for unbiased agents from 0 to 1. The parameters used in the simulations were n = 10 3 , p = 0.51, k = 6, f = 0.4. The plot shows a slight nonconformity at very low q, due to the fact that the running time required to allow the final steady state to be reached gets exponentially longer as q → 0 + .
Appendix B: Regression results
Theory and model interpretation
Our model is stylized, and therefore largely agnostic as to a particular interpretation of its parameters. Nevertheless, it is quite well suited to provide an initial exploration on a number of issue. In this Appendix, we shall test the model's ability to shed light on the impact that Internet access has on shaping popular opinion on specific issues (global warming in this case). In order to do this, we first specify how we are going to relate our model's parameters to real-world measurable quantities.
There are two convenient (and pragmatically equivalent) interpretations of the model in the context of Internet use. Consider the agent-specific ghost node interpretation, where each ghost node attached to a biased agent represents an aggregation of the "filter bubble" (passive algorithmic affects) and "selective exposure" (actively selecting information in a biased way) effects. An increase in Internet access therefore translates to an increase in access to these selfconfirmatory effects, and corresponds to changing unbiased agents into biased agents (an increase in f ). Alternatively, one could consider a scenario where the fraction of biased agents is fixed, in which case an increase in Internet would improve their ability to obtain self-confirmatory information (an increase in q). For the purposes of this exploration, however, the two effects are equivalent, and for convenience we only retain the interpretation where f increases.
As far as the interpretation of the degree variable k is concerned, the important distinction to make here is that we are not interested in "social networks" as a catch-all term for the number of family and friends one has. Rather, given As discussed in the main text, the model predicts such distribution to be a Gaussian (for both large n and k) with mean equal to x * U and variance given by Eq. (5). x * U is kept fixed to demonstrate the effect of varying f and k. As shown in the case for k/f = 120, f and k trade off, and scaling both by the same constant results in the same distribution. The parameters used in the simulations were n = 10 4 , x * U = 0.55, q = 0.6.
the model, we are interested in the degree to which individuals actively exchange information with their underlying social network with regards to the topic of interest. Therefore, for k we wish to measure the volume of active social information diffusion in a given population. As per Eq. 5, one of our model's main results is that f and k work in opposite directions when it comes to polarisation -an increase in confirmatory behaviours increases polarisation and is equivalent to a reduction in social information. Furthermore, if the majority of the population accurately learns the ground truth (x * U > 1/2), reductions in polarisation can be translated to an increase in consensus on the truth, as a smaller fraction of the population will arrive at inaccurate beliefs.
Translated to current research on the role of the Internet, we attempt to use our model to shed light on what has been thought of as the dichotomous effects of Internet access on social learning and polarisation. On one hand it has been argued that Internet access improves exposure to diverse information via social networks [16, 55, 56] , whereas on another it has been argued that Internet access enables confirmation bias on a previously unprecedented scale [12, 42] . These contradictory effects may be in part responsible for the range of conflicting results obtained in recent research.
Data sources and measuring variables
In order to test the model's predictions in the aforementioned context, we gathered data from the Yale Programme on Climate Change Communication 2016 Opinion Maps [45] , which provides state and county level survey data on opinions on global warming, as well as behaviours such as the propensity to discuss climate change with friends and family. We combined this with FCC 2016 county level data on residential high speed Internet access [46] . Finally, we also used a supplemental source in the data aggregated by the Joint Economic Council's Social Capital Project [47] , a government initiative aiming to measure social capital at a county level by aggregating a combination of state and county level data from sources such as the American Community Survey, the Current Population Survey, and the IRS.
In this context, we measured accuracy as the estimated fraction of the population believing that "global warming is happening". We refer to this as "GW Accuracy". This is purposefully distinct from a second available opinion variable from the survey, which is the estimated fraction who believe global warming is "man-made". In other words, we are attempting to examine the degree to which social information and access to confirmatory bias mechanisms affect the ability of individuals to accurately learn an objective, measurable ground truth (that global temperatures are rising) rather than tackle the more complex and controversial question of whether it is man-made. Internet access is measured by the FCC's data on county-level high speed broadband penetration amongst residentials (in [42] , the authors utilise another instrumental variable approach to argue that increased broadband penetration does in fact increase Internet use). In Table I we demonstrate preliminary ordinary least squares regression results by regressing GW Accuracy on Internet access, accounting for a range of covariates such as median age, median income, county population size and the fraction of adults with college degrees. The results indicate that even after controlling for relevant covariates, the net effect of Internet access on accuracy is positive 11 (and by interpretation, the effect of polarisation on this particular ground truth is negative).
However, this alone is insufficient as research indicates Internet access is likely to improve the degree to which individuals can communicate information to friends and family, which in our model is precisely the variable k. The Yale Climate Change data includes a measure estimating the fraction of the county population that discusses global warming regularly with family and friends ("Social Discussion"). To sense check this, Table I (column 2) demonstrates that increased Internet access does indeed improve the ability to discuss matters with friends and family, even after controlling for relevant covariates, which is consistent with a broad set of empirical research on the topic (see [57] for a review).
Therefore, this allows us to construct our final model in Table 1 (3) where we regress GW Accuracy on both Social Discussion and Internet access (and the covariates). We can now interpret the coefficient on Internet access as the residual effect of Internet access after controlling for the effect it has on Social Discussion. This aggregates the effects of Internet access on things such as filter bubbles, algorithmic effects, selective exposure, etc. and lines up much more cleanly with the variable f in our model. The results confirm our hypothesis -Social Discussion (k) and Residual Internet Access (f ) act in opposite directions when it comes to learning the ground truth, even after conditioning on a range of covariates.
It is worth unpacking these results in detail. The direct effect of a 1 percentage point increase in Internet access on global warming accuracy is negative 12 (−2.400). The direct effect on social discussion is extremely positive 13 (3.736), which leads to a corresponding improvement in accuracy 14 of 1.057×3.736 ≈ 3.95. The net effect, of course, is positive (3.95 − 2.40 = 1.55), as indicated in the original, simple regression 15 . However, breaking down the causal mechanism into its constituent elements -direct internet use effects vs socially mediated internet effects -allows us the capture the nuance of what is actually happening. Note: * p <0.1; * * p <0.05; * * * p <0.01
Accounting for simultaneous causality
A clear shortcoming of the above analysis is the fact that the variable "Social Discussion" is likely to have a reverse causal relationship with the outcome variable of "GW Accuracy". That is, the more likely individuals are to believe global warming is happening, the more likely they are to discuss this topic with friends and family.
In order to account for this, we will take an instrumental variable approach. That is, we need some instrument that can account for independent variation in discussion with family and friends, which is otherwise unlikely to affect the belief in global warming. We note as before that k can be interpreted as the fraction of the "underlying social network" that is activated to transmit social information related to the topic of global warming. We are therefore interested in a variable that can measure the pre-existing strength of these underlying social networks. To do so, we make use of the Social Capital Project, a government research programme by the Joint Economic Committee that attempts to measure Social Capital at a state and county level throughout the US. Social Capital as defined in this study (and numerous others 16 ) refers broadly to something "related to social relationships, social networks, and civil society". More specifically, it is measured with an intention to reflect communities with "an abundance of close, supportive relationships" [47] .
The index itself measures a spectrum of factors, and in particular a "Community Health" subindex. The subindex is calculated as the leading principal component across a variety of state and county-level measures of community engagement (where people ostensibly meet and socialise with friends and family), including religious congregations, non-religious non-profit activities, public meeting attendance, working with neighbours to fix things, attending a meeting where politics was discussed, etc. This index is then validated by examining bivariate correlations with a battery of county level benchmarks and measures of social dysfunction.
The strength of this instrument is established in Table II (column 1) , where a first stage least squares regression is run to show that improvements in Community Health do translate to improved discussion with friends and family (controlling for covariates).
The validity is established through a series of additional checks. Factors such as religious attendance, public meetings, etc. are unlikely to have a causal effect on people's beliefs about global warming independent of them being a medium to allow for social discussion of these topics. The only other reasonable and plausibly significant causal channel is if these factors are caused by or cause an increase membership in social groups (for instance, political parties) that are strongly associated with reduced belief in global warming. In particular, it is well-established that members of the Republican Party have a reduced belief in the existence of Global Warming [50] . To check this, we examined the bivariate correlation between Community Health and the percentage of GOP votes cast in the 2016 presidential election. The results were weak, with a correlation of only 0.14, meaning only 1.8% of the variation in the measures were explained by the relationship.
Having established the strength and validity of the instrument, we demonstrate the results from the two stage least squares regression results in Table II (column 2) . We can see the qualitative results of the simpler model have been preserved, with the effects predictably attenuated. However, the results are still significant, and corroborate our theory. After separating out the social and confirmatory effects of Internet access, we can see the impact on Accuracy (and Polarisation) both occur in the direction that we predict.
Once again, let us unpack the results. The direct effect of a 1 percentage point increase in internet access on global warming accuracy is negative 17 (−1.712). The direct effect on social discussion is extremely positive 18 (3.143), which leads to a corresponding improvement in accuracy 19 of 0.872 × 3.143 ≈ 2.74. The net effect, of course, is positive (2.74 − 1.71 = 1.03). Once again, breaking down the causal mechanism into its constituent elements -direct internet use effects vs socially mediated internet effects -allows us the capture the nuance of what is actually happening.
It appears, for the topic of global warming, the net impact of Internet access on social learning is positive. Increase in Internet access has a direct negative impact on learning (via f , or q). However, it leads to a significant positive impact on social discussion (k), and the net result of this is positive. This result remains robust even after controlling for a battery of relevant covariates.
It should be emphasized that this result is merely an initial exploration of how our model can provide some testable predictions to empirical data, as opposed to a detailed effort to understand the effect of Internet access on global warming beliefs. Having said that, the initial results are encouraging, and we hope the clarity of the analytic results of our model pave the way for testing variations of the idea of biased information aggregation in a range of outcomes and settings. Note: * p <0.1; * * p <0.05; * * * p <0.01
